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CREATIVITY REVISITED
RALPH D. CLIFFORD1
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I.

THE SCHOLARSHIP REVISITED

<SW :0R'W+*R)q /V \Wt dv2.*SR+W9* >[S/Ov+*SR.
Redux Conference invited a reexamination of an earlier
work of IP scholarship to address what has happened in the

1
Professor of Law, University of Massachusetts School of Law. The
author wishes to thank the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual
Property at the University of New Hampshire School of Law for inviting
me to present this paper at its 2018 Scholarship Redux conference and
for all that UNH Law does to support IP scholars.
2
FRANK HERBERT, CHILDREN OF DUNE 124 (Berkley ed. 1976).
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area since the time of its original publication.3 As my
contribution to the Conference, I revisited my 1997 article
that discussed the consequences of the increasing
*/.SR*)R[v)R/0 /V v+)RVR[RvO R0)WOORTW0[W oU#c=n /0 )SW
production of new copyrightable or patentable works4 as
well as the follow-up article I published in 2004 that focused
expressly on copyright law.5 The primary call of the
[/0VW+W0[W tv* )/ ZR*[(** )SW UOWTvO .+WZR[)R/0* y)Sv) tW+Wx
right—/+ t+/0T8=6 In line with the call, this essay will
present both the wins and losses from my earlier scholarship
and will then suggest where future research is needed.
II.

PREDICTIONS THAT WERE RIGHT

The basic thesis of the articles is that computergenerated works fail to qualify for intellectual property
.+/)W[)R/0 tSW+W )SW */(+[W /V )SW t/+P9* (0ZW+OqR0T
creativity is computer-generated. In Creative Programs, this
assertion was stated as:
[T]he ultimate question [is] who can claim a copyright
in the expressive works fixed by [a creative computer
program]? The claim of the user of the [program]
seems highly dubious. The user was not the originator
of [the] expression[] as no specific creative effort was
exerted by the user. Consequently, a claim of
3
See The Intellectual Property Scholarship Redux Conference,
UNIVERSITY
OF
NEW
HAMPSHIRE
SCHOOL
OF
LAW,
https://law.unh.edu/event/2018/04/intellectual-property-scholarshipredux-conference (last visited Mar. 11, 2018) [hereinafter Redux
Conference].
4
Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative
Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL.
L. REV. 1675 (1997) [hereinafter Clifford, Creative Programs].
5
Ralph D. Clifford, Random Numbers, Chaos Theory, and Cogitation:
A Search for the Minimal Creativity Standard in Copyright Law, 82
DENVER U. L. REV. 259 (2004) [hereinafter Clifford, Copyright
Creativity].
6
See Redux Conference, supra note 3.

59 IDEA 25 (2018)

Creativity Revisited

27

authorship by the user is unsustainable. Similarly, the
[creative computer program] itself is not able to claim
the copyright because such claims are limited to
humans. The answer to the ultimate question,
)SW+WV/+Wl R* U0/ /0Wj= 6R)S/() v [OvR2v0)l )SW t/+P
presumably enters the public domain. 7

Scholars have examined this area numerous times
since the articles were released. Most of these scholars—
particularly those who were examining copyright law—
agreed with the primary thesis that computer-generated
works are not subject to protection.8 This is also the position
of the Copyright Office.9 Only a few scholars have
7

Clifford, Creative Programs, supra note 4, at 1695 (citations omitted);
accord Clifford, Copyright Creativity, supra note 5, at 260. It should be
noted that neither article asserted that the developing power of AI
technology suggested that computers (or animals) should be recognized
as creative or legal actors. See Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing
Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 425 n.224 (2017); Dane E. Johnson,
Statute of Anne-Imals: Should Copyright Protect Sentient Nonhuman
Creators?, 15 Animal L. 15, 20 (2008). Indeed, the primary conclusion
of both of my articles was that no thing has the right to claim U.S.
intellectual property protection; instead, human-based creativity leading
to the work is a prerequisite.
8
See Amir H. Khoury, Intellectual Property Rights for “Hubots”: On
the Legal Implications of Human-Like Robots As Innovators and
Creators, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 651 (2017); James
Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing As A Computer-Authored Workand It’s A Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403 (2016); Jani
McCutcheon, The Vanishing Author in Computer-Generated Works: A
Critical Analysis of Recent Australian Case Law, 36 MELB. U. L. REV.
915, 931 (2013) (discussing Australian law); Annemarie Bridy, Coding
Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶ 51 (2012); Charles Cronin, Virtual Music Scores,
Copyright and the Promotion of a Marginalized Technology, 28 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 1, 18 (2004); David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea
Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 32 (2001).
9
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES § 306 (3d ed. 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/
(U[T]he Office will refuse to register a claim if it determines that a human
being did not create the work.=).
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dissented10 as have a few students.11 Courts have not
addressed computer-based A.I. generated works (yet), but
have found that the copyright statute requires a human rather
than another animal as author for protection to be available.12
<SW [/(+)9* O/TR[ t/(OZ *WW2 )/ v..Oq tR)S equal or greater
force to computer-generated works. In sum, nothing that has
happened since 1997 changes my conclusion that a human
author or inventor is needed for protection.
The other aspect of the articles that was clearly
correct was the prediction that the use of AI technology
would become increasingly common.13 In fact, this is
happening.14 The technology is becoming more capable as
its algorithms are refined and as the processing power of the
underlying computers increases.15 Its use in the main-stream
laboratory is acknowledged as part of—or a replacement
10

See Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and
the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2016); Robert C.
Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for Computer-Generated
Works, 69 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 251, 275 (2016); Schuster, W. Michael,
A Coasean Analysis of Ownership of Patents for Inventions Created by
Artificial Intelligence, 75 WASH. AND LEE L.R. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 14), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3132753.
11
See Russ Pearlman, Comment, Recognizing Artificial Intelligence (AI)
as Authors and Inventors Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 24
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 3 (2018); William T. Ralston, Comment,
Copyright in Computer-Composed Music: Hal Meets Handel, 52 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC9Y U.S.A. 281, 293 (2005).
12
See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 426 (9th Cir. 2018) (U[A]nimals
other than humans lack statutory standing to sue under the Copyright
Act.=).
13
See Clifford, Copyright Creativity, supra note 5, at 260 n.5.
14
See, e.g., Iprova, Artificial Intelligence Used for New Inventions
Unveiled, IPROVA (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.iprova.com/
news/artificial-intelligence-used-for-new-inventions-unveiled/.
15
See Chris Edwards, Deep Learning Hunts for Signals Among the
Noise, COMM. ACM, June 2018, at 13; Diana Kwon, Self-Taught Robots,
SCI. AMER., March 2018, at 26; David Pogue, The Robotic Artist
Problem, SCI. AMER., Feb. 2018, at 23; Ben Dickson, Can Artificial
Intelligence Be Truly Creative, PC MAG., Jan. 2018, at 93.
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for—human innovation.16 A good example of this is the
LED invention described in the University of California San
{RWT/9* .+W** +WOWv*Wj17 According to the release, the new
chemical composition fo+ v0 _g{ tv* UZR*[/'W+WZ (*R0T v
systematic, high-)S+/(TS.() [/2.()v)R/0vO v..+/v[S= )Sv)
U.+WZR[)yWZx= )SW [/2./*R)R/0 /V R)j18 Having been given the
conception of the new device by the computer, the human
R0'W0)/+* )SW0 UVRT(+WZ /() )SW +W[R.W 0WWZWZ )/ make the
0Wt .S/*.S/+j=19 In other words, half of the inventive
process—conception—was predominantly not human-based
while the reduction to practice was the opposite.20 This
computer-human combination where the computer
innovates and the human implements is becoming
common.21

16

See, e.g., Press Release, Univ. Cal. San Diego, Supercomputers Aid
Discovery of New, Inexpensive Material to Make LEDS with Excellent
Color Quality (Feb. 19, 2018), http://jacobsschool.ucsd.edu/
news/news_releases/release.sfe?id=2476 [hereinafter Press Release].
The Uinvention= described in the Press Release has been claimed for
patent. E-mail from Shyue Ping Ong, Assoc. Prof., Univ. Cal. San
Diego, to author (May 23, 2018, 18:30 EST) (on file with author).
17
Press Release, supra note 16.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d
1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (UConception is the formation in the mind
of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and
operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.= (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)). For the UCSD LED, the
conception was formed in the computer and was provided, fully formed,
to the human Uinventor.= As Clifford, Copyright Creativity, supra note
5, at 294, argues, Uclaiming credit for a work generated by an
autonomously creative, artificially intelligent computer program= should
defeat the human9s claim for I.P. protection.
21
See, e.g., Tomasz Klucznik, et al., Efficient Syntheses of Diverse,
Medicinally Relevant Targets Planned by Computer and Executed in the
Laboratory, 4 CHEM. 522, 522 (2018); Matthew H. Todd, ComputerAided Organic Synthesis, 34 CHEM. SOC9Y REV. 247 (2005).

Volume 59 – Number 1

30 IDEA – The Law Review of the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property
<SW v+)R[OW*9 /)SW+ .+WZR[)R/0 vu/() #c tv* )Sv) )SW+W
was no immediate need to decide if an AI should be
considered a constitutional person as the technology had not
achieved enough in the 1990s for this to be a legitimate
question.22 My re-evaluation here, even after twenty plus
years, is that this remains true. Clearly, AI technology today
has more capability than it had in 1997, but it does not
approach human-level abilities.23 Whether it will soon
achieve consciousness or other indicators of becoming an
independent and autonomous being remains just as doubtful
today as it was in 1997. After all, to achieve self-awareness
in a computer, we need to understand what consciousness is
and what causes it, something that remains far beyond the
understanding of current science.24
III.

PREDICTIONS THAT WERE MORE PROBLEMATIC

There are two areas where my earlier articles may be
criticized as not being precise in their predictions. First, the
v+)R[OW* V/[(*WZ .+R2v+ROq /0 #c9* [/0*W,(W0[W* /0

22

Clifford, Creative Programs, supra note 4, at 1703; cf. Clifford,
Copyright Creativity, supra note 5, at 294Y95.
23
Cf. Associated Press, Self-driving SUV in Fatal Arizona Crash Saw
Pedestrian but Didn’t Brake, Board Says, BOSTON GLOBE (May 24,
2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2018/05/24/self-drivingsuv-fatal-arizona-crash-saw-pedestrian-but-didn-brake-boardsays/ZsmJzo9PatEwsbEjk5nHFJ/story.html.
24
See Christof Koch, What Is Consciousness?, SCI. AMER., June 2018,
at 61. Indeed, Dr. Koch predicts that the scientific effort to understand
consciousness will take Udecades.= Id. at 64. My estimate would be
much longer (if ever). When I was a student of computer science in the
1970s, I was told that human-like artificially intelligent computers would
exist within fifty years, a period that is now expiring without the
technology being produced. While the overall Ucompetence= of
artificially intelligent algorithms has grown significantly since the 1970s,
programming an AI that can even mimic human mental abilities seems
only a little closer today than it was then.
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copyright rather than patent law.25 It seems now, partially
uW[v(*W /V )SW vZ'v0)vTW /V SR0Z*RTS)l )Sv) #c9* R2.v[) /0
patent law will be the more profound of the two. Second,
the articles focused exclusively on the qualification
question: was there sufficient human-based creativity in the
work developed by an AI to claim IP protection?26 They did
not address any other consequences that the ubiquitous use
of the technology would cause.27 Innovation is relevant in
areas other than under section 101 of the Patent Act28 or
section 102 of the Copyright Act,29 v0Z #c9* R2.v[) 2(*) uW
weighed there too. Each of these is considered in the
following sections.
A.

The Use of AI to Create Patentable
Inventions is Likely to be More Common
than its Use to Create Copyrightable
Expressions

Patent law is likely to face a greater impact from the
use of AI technology than copyright law because of the
differing motivations that trigger people to create works that
are protected by the two systems. While both patent and
copyright law are designed to provide economic incentives
for the innovator to create and disclose, patent law is more
directly connected to commercial exploitation than

25

Compare Clifford, Creative Programs, supra note 4, at 1681Y95, with
Christof Koch, What is Consciousness?, supra note 24, at 1695Y97. The
second article was exclusively about copyright law and did not address
the standards for patent law at all. See Clifford, Copyright Creativity,
supra note 5.
26
See Clifford, Copyright Creativity, supra note 5, at 260Y62; Clifford,
Creative Programs, supra note 4, at 1676Y77.
27
See Clifford, Copyright Creativity, supra note 5, at 260Y62; Clifford,
Creative Programs, supra note 4, at 1676Y77.
28
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
29
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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copyright law is. 30 A few examples will demonstrate this.
First, consider poetry. Many authors produce poetry, but
few expect the poetry, even with the copyright system in
place, to result in an appreciable financial reward.31 Second,
music too is often created for the artistic pleasure of creation
and self-expression rather than an expectation of financial
reward.32
Finally, even the core area of copyright
authorship—prose writing—is not immune from this as
many authors produce works with little or no hope of a
financial return.33 I would be writing this essay regardless
of the existence of the copyright system, and do not expect
any economic return to be provided to me because of it.
When the patent system is examined, on the other
hand, the motivations of a typical inventor are strikingly
different. While the emotional satisfaction received from
having created a patentable invention is not lacking, it is
unlikely that a modern, industrial- or college-based research
laboratory would seek to create new technology without the
30

Compare World Intellectual Property Organization, Frequently Asked
Questions: Patents, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wipo.int/patents/en/faq_patents.html (UA patent system
intends to correct such under-provision of innovative activities by
providing innovators with limited exclusive rights, thereby giving the
innovators the possibility to receive appropriate returns on their
innovative activities.=), with World Intellectual Property Organization,
Frequently Asked Questions: Copyright, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/faq_
copyright.html (discussing economic and moral rights).
31
See Jeremy Spencer, A Harsh Truth About Poetry Publishing, REAL
PANTS (Jan. 28, 2015), https://realpants.com/harsh-truth-poetrypublishing/.
32
See PAUL RUTTER, THE MUSIC INDUS. HANDBOOK ch. 2 (2d ed. 2016).
33
James Fray, What Type of Financial Return Can I Expect on my Book
Publishing
Investment,
MONKEYSEE
(June
16,
2009),
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd
=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjR2NGH957bAhVFmlkKHYhW
BHQQFggnMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmonkeysee.com%2Fwhattype-of-financial-return-can-i-expect-on-my-book-publishinginvestment%2F&usg=AOvVaw3gNvmZbg6x-hAKYSUZM9GQ.
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patent system in place to capture the initial financial reward
from the invention.34
It is probable that, without the
financial return provided by the patent system, the
multimillion to multibillion dollar investment35 in a research
project would not occur and the invention would not be
made.36
The increased financial focus of the inventor over
that of the writer has consequences. With the greater
34

Most research today—as has probably been true for at least the last
hundred years—does not occur in the garage of a single inventor;
instead, it involves teamwork combined with a significant financial
investment. See Sara Koch, The Myth of Isolation, THE CASE
FOUNDATION (Nov. 24, 2015), https://casefoundation.org/blog/themyth-of-isolation/.
35
Precise figures for how much it costs to develop a new product are not
available. See Aaron E. Carroll, $2.6 Billion to Develop a Drug? New
Estimate Makes Questionable Assumptions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/upshot/calculating-thereal-costs-of-developing-a-new-drug.html. As Mr. Carroll reports, the
estimates for the cost of each new drug runs from $2.6 billion down to
$161 million. Even if the low estimate is accepted, this significant of an
investment could not be made if compensation were unavailable.
Development costs in other industries is likely less than in the drug
industry but is still significant. It is estimated, for example, that Apple
spent more than $150 million to develop the iPhone. See Fred
Vogelstein, And Then Steve Said, $Let There Be an iPhone’, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/magazine/andthen-steve-said-let-there-be-aniphone.html?pagewanted=all&auth=login-email.
36
Of course, I am not arguing that all inventions that are subject to the
patent act are done primarily because of the financial award that may be
available, only that most are. Indeed, the immediate release of the World
Wide Web technology into the public domain by its inventor, would
make such a broad argument fail. See The Man Who Would Have Been
a
Trillionaire,
7
FIGURE
BLOG
(July
29,
2012),
http://yourlifesolution.com/7/the-man-who-would-have-been-atrillionaire/. At the same time, though, the extraordinary decision made
by Sir Berners-Lee to disclaim any intellectual property claim to the most
profound technology of the last thirty years is notable because he walked
away from hundreds of billions of dollars. His selflessness is notable
because it is rare.
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investment needed and risk associated with producing a new
invention, a correspondingly higher financial incentive
develops to use any technology that is available—including
creativity-providing technology—to try to avoid failure. In
other words, the natural effect of a profit-motive focus is to
seek the most direct path to a financial reward, even if the
human involved surrenders his or her own creative desires.37
In summary, from a motive perspective, using AI to invent
is directly incentivized while using it to write affirmatively
interferes.
In hindsight, therefore, I wish that the articles had
*.W0) 2/+W )R2W vZZ+W**R0T .v)W0) Ovtj #c9* (*W R0 R0'W0)R0T
is the more important issue to be evaluated.
Unfortunately, unlike the Copyright Office, the
Patent and Trademark Office does not seem to be sensitive
to this problem. As described in the MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP)l )SW UR0'W0)/+= R* +W,(R+WZ
)/ U[/0)+Ru()W )/ )SW [/0[W.)R/0 /V )SW R0'W0)R/0l= u() )SW+W
is no examination as to whether the sole source of the
conception was computer-based.38 Indeed, the MPEP seems
)/ v()S/+RpW .v)W0) [OvR2* uq )SW S(2v0 U*/ O/0T v* y)SW
human] maintains intellectual domination of the work of
makinT )SW R0'W0)R/0j=39 With current technology, how can
)SW S(2v0 0/) UR0)WOOW[)(vOyOqx Z/2R0v)yWx= )SW t/+P v* )SW
human still controls the on-/VV u())/0$ <SW A<B9* VvRO(+W )/
exclude computer-[/0[WR'WZ UR0'W0)R/0*= vV)W+ *W'W+vO

37

See Ben Hattenbach & Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinite
Monkeys and Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 32, 35
(2015) (Ucomputers are already independently designing genuinely
useful inventions in a number of fields.=).
38
See MPEP § 2137.01 (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018).
39
Id. at § 2137.01(III). The legal authority cited by the PTO is Morse v.
Porter, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 280 (B.P.A.I. 1965). The date of the
decision alone suggests that its concern was collaboration among a team
of human inventors rather than using computer-generated conceptions.
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decades is worrisome as it is likely to be yet another cause
of decreasing patent quality. 40
B.

The Prevalence of AI Requires Patent
Obviousness to be Reconsidered

The other area where the articles were somewhat
shortsighted was the failure to appreciate the consequences
of AI on other areas of patent law beyond the initial
qualification for patent under Section 101.41 In particular,
AI is likely to have a significant effect on obviousness
jurisprudence42 and the definition of prior art.43 Each will be
discussed in turn.
1. Obviousness
As the use of AI becomes omnipresent in the
invention process, this will change the evaluation of
obviousness under § 103. As the classic test requires,
the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this

40
See Ralph D. Clifford, Is it Time for a Rule 11 for the Patent Bar?, 53
IDEA 351 (2013); Ralph D. Clifford et al., A Statistical Analysis of the
Patent Bar: Where Are the Software-Savvy Patent Attorneys?, 11 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 223 (2010).
41
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
42
Id. at § 103. I first began thinking about this connection when I
received an e-mail newsletter from Greg Aharonian of the Internet Patent
News Service. E-mail from Internet Patent News Service to author (Apr.
5, 2018 10:25 EDT) (UIs human use of these increasingly powerful AI
tools something that is an obvious capability of a PHOSITA?=) (on file
with author).
43
This is under both the novelty bars under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) and
the use of prior art in MPEP § 103 (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html.
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background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the
subject matter is determined. 44

As it becomes routine to use AI as part of the
invention process, the determination of what constitutes
U/+ZR0v+q *PROO R0 )SW .W+)R0W0) v+)=45 changes. To see this,
assume that using AI is a normal part of the average
)W[S0/O/TR*)9* +W.W+)/R+Wj46 The law then would assume that
it would be used by the PHOSITA to test out the difficulty
of producing the new technology claimed in a patent from
the technology that existed upon filing.47 If this, in turn,
t/(OZ OWvZ )SW #c )/ U+W-R0'W0)= )SW [OvR2WZ )W[S0/O/Tql )SW
AI-assisted PHOSITA has now been able to produce the
invention only using ordinary skills.48 By becoming
common place, AI has the power to render inventions
predictable and obvious.
<SR* R* V(+)SW+ +WR0V/+[WZ uW[v(*W /V )SW U)Wv[SR0Tl
*(TTW*)R/0l /+ 2/)R'v)R/0= oU<>^=n )W*)j49 As the Supreme
Court explained,

44

Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
Id. The classic label of this hypothetical individual is a PHOSITA, a
person having ordinary skills in the art. E.g., Elbit Sys. of Am., LLC v.
Thales Visionix, Inc., 881 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
46
Its use is common today but may not have reached the level described
in this hypothetical. See Edwards, supra note 14, at 13; Kwon, supra
note 15, at 26; Pogue, supra note 15, at 23, Dickson, supra note 15, at
93; Iprova, supra note 14; Clifford, Copyright Creativity, supra note 4,
at 260 n.5; Press Release, supra note 16.
47
Elbit Sys. of Am., LLC, 881 F.3d at 1357.
48
The presumption here is that the PHOSITA would have an AI network
available which has already been trained in the relevant domain. The
limitations caused by the training, already being studied because of the
implications on the results generated by the AI, would also be important
to further considerations of obviousness being raised by this essay. See
Edwards, supra note 15.
49
See, e.g., Application of Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956-57 (C.C.P.A. 1961)
(establishing what becomes the TSM test).
45
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When a work is available in one field of endeavor,
design incentives and other market forces can prompt
variations of it, either in the same field or a different
one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a
predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its
patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has
been used to improve one device, and a person of
ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would
improve similar devices in the same way, using the
technique is obvious unless its actual application is
beyond his or her skill. 50

As an AI is used, it develops a training domain that
can grow in unpredictable ways. 51 Even where the human
users of the AI initially choose the information to start the
#c9* P0/tOWZTW uv*Wl (*W /V )SW #c [Sv0TW* )SW domain.52
In effect, an AI will naturally apply the technology it knows
about from one field to answer other questions arising in
v0/)SW+j c0 /)SW+ t/+Z*l R) t/(OZ U+W[/T0RpW )Sv) R) t/(OZ
R2.+/'W y)SW 0Wtx ZW'R[Wyx R0 )SW *v2W tvq yv* )SW /OZxj= 53
Even wR)S )SW >(.+W2W !/(+)9* +W2R0ZW+ )Sv) v VOWrRuOW (*W
of the TSM test is needed,54 AI now renders the new
combinations obvious, 55 a fate that may be shared by all
other inventions that can be made by AI.
2. The Prior Art
As well as changing the determination by a
PHOSITA that an invention is obvious, AI may have
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KSR Int9l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
See Edwards, supra note 15.
52
See Kwon, supra note 15.
53
KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 417.
54
See id. at 419.
55
Cf. InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc9ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327,
1351Y53 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (requiring Ua reason or motivation= for
combining existing technology). Now, of course, that reason is provided
by the AI itself.
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consequences as to what is considered to be prior art.56
Again, a hypothetical will demonstrate the problem.
Suppose someone establishes a web site that allows anyone
to pose a proposed new invention to an AI. The AI has been
programmed to conceive of as many ways as it can to
practice each new invention. When found, the solutions are
immediately stored in a searchable, online database.
Under this hypothetical, the online database would
seem be a U.+R0)WZ .(uOR[v)R/0j=57 By allowing access to
v0q/0W /0 )SW c0)W+0W)l )SW Zv)vuv*W R* Uv[[W**RuOW )/ )SW
.(uOR[ R0)W+W*)WZ R0 )SW v+)j=58 Whether a database available
/0 )SW 6/+OZ 6RZW 6Wu R* U.+R0)WZ= R* v 0Wt R**(Wl u()
would seem to have the permanence and availability that is
the essence of what is considered to be printed.59
Having been described in a printed publication, 35
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) establishes that the AI-produced
inventions thereafter anticipate identical patent claims and
serve as part of the prior art for all others.60 Now, with the
exactitude needed for anticipation, the database is unlikely
to bar all or most claims on that ground, but prior art
references need not describe the precise four-corners of
claimed invention.61 All that is needed is that a PHOSITA,
56

See generally 3 R. CARL MOY, MOY9S WALKER ON PATENTS § 9:17
(4th ed. Supp. 2017).
57
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
58
Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
59
See Hangzhou Chic Intelligent Tech. Co. v. Razor USA LLC, No.
2:16-CV-06359-RGK (AJWx), 2016 WL 10518582, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 19, 2016) (finding that a Kickstarter listing is a printed publication).
See generally Gerald Rose, Do You Have a “Printed Publication?” If
Not, Do You Have Evidence of Prior “Knowledge or Use?, J. PAT. OFF.
SOC9Y 643 (1979) (describing the difficulty of determining if something
is a printed publication).
60
See Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707,
715Y16 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
61
See id. at 716.

59 IDEA 25 (2018)
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having the database, would find the claimed invention
obvious.
To pose the ultimate question, assume that no one
had presented a claimed invention to the AI before the patent
application was filed. With this change, there is no printed
publication, so that source of the existing prior art is not
available. At the same time, all the PHOSITA has to do to
make the AI derive the claim, however, is to ask. In other
words, the existence of the AI makes it possible that any
PHOSITA can derive any claim by using the ordinary skills
associated with using an AI to invent. The implication of
this is that any claimed invention—indeed, potentially all
claimed inventions—will be obvious.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This essay suggests that the development and use of
artificial intelligence to make inventions raise some
significant issues involving patent prior art that is worthy of
additional study. 62 While I do not believe we have reached
the time today where it is obligatory, ultimately, we may
need to ask an uncomfortable question: if AI can be more
innovative than humans, do we still need the patent system?
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It should be noted that Liza Vertinsky and William Samore have begun
this work on the legal side. See Liza Vertinsky, Thinking Machines and
Patent Law in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1516 (Forthcoming 2018); Liza Vertinsky, Boundary-Spanning
Collaboration and the Limits of Joint Inventorship Doctrine, 55 HOUS.
L. REV. 401, 432Y33 (2017); William Samore, Artificial Intelligence and
the Patent System: Can a New Tool Render a Once Patentable Idea
Obvious?, 29 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 113 (2013). Similarly,
the exploration of what AI technology can achieve continues within the
computer science discipline. See Edwards, supra note 15; Kwon, supra
note 15.
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